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Despite the fact that one-third of worldwide mergers involve firms  from different countries, the vast 
majority of the academic literature on mergers studies domestic mergers. What little has been written 
about cross-border mergers has focused on public firms, usually from the United States. Yet, the vast 
majority of cross-border mergers involve private firms that are not from the United States. We provide an 
analysis  of  a  sample  of  56,978  cross-border  mergers  occurring  between  1990  and  2007.  We  first 
characterize the patterns of who buys whom: Geography matters, with firms being much more likely to 
purchase firms in nearby countries than in countries far away. Purchasers are usually but not always from 
developed countries and they tend to purchase firms in countries with  lower accounting standards. A 
significant factor in determining acquisition patterns is currency movements; firms tend to purchase firms 
from countries relative to which the currency of the acquirer‟s country has  appreciated.  In addition, 
economy-wide factors reflected in the country‟s stock market returns lead to acquisitions as well. Both the 
currency and stock market effect could suggest either misvaluation or wealth explanations. Our evidence 
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1. Introduction. 
The volume of cross-border acquisitions has been growing worldwide, from 23 percent of the 
total merger volume in 1998 to 45 percent in 2007. Some of these cross-border mergers occur for exactly 
the same reasons as domestic mergers, e.g., synergies, market power, and/or managerial preferences. Yet, 
in an international context, there are a number of additional factors, such as cross-country differences in 
macroeconomic conditions, legal regimes, political systems, culture, regulatory environments, and tax 
systems, that could potentially affect cross-border mergers. Differences in valuation between potential 
acquirers and targets have been documented to be one motive for domestic mergers.
1 These valuation 
differences are likely to be even more important in an international context since movements in country-
level stock markets and currencies provide additional sources of valuation differences. 
This paper considers the extent to which valuation differences and other international factors 
motivate cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Valuation differences between acquirers and targets can 
be broken into three components: Differences in country -level stock market movements, differences in 
firm-specific stock price movements relative to country-level indices, and appreciation or depreciation of 
the currencies in which acquirers‟ and targets‟ securities are traded. Each of these components reflects an 
alternative source of valuation difference that could potentially motivate mergers. We estimate the effect 
of these factors on merger propensities using a sample of 56,978 cross-border mergers occurring between 
1990 and 2007.   
In  contrast  to  most  of  the  prior  literature  that  focuses  on  mergers  of  public  firms,  usually 
involving U.S. acquirers or targets, our sample better reflects the universe of cross-border mergers, the 
majority of which involve private firms from outside the U.S. In our sample, 80% of completed cross-
border deals between 1990 and 2007 targeted a non-US firm, while 75% of the acquirers are from outside 
the U.S. Furthermore, the vast majority of cross-border mergers involve private firms as either bidder or 
target: 96% of the deals involve a private target, 26% involve a private acquirer, and 97% have either 
                                                 
1 See Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004), Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson and Teoh 
(2006), and Harford (2005).    2 
private acquirers or targets. Hence, the inclusion of private firms in our analysis is important, especially 
since most other studies use samples of publicly-traded firms or lump private acquisitions in with other 
investments as foreign direct investment (FDI).  
Cross-sectionally, there are a number of patterns that characterize the distribution of acquirers and 
targets in cross-border merger. First, geography clearly matters; holding other things constant, the shorter 
the distance between two countries, the more likely there are acquirers from one country to the other. 
Second, purchasers are usually but not always from developed countries and they tend to purchase firms 
in countries with lower accounting standards. Third, acquirers are more likely to be from countries with 
higher corporate income taxes than the country where targets are located. Finally, mergers are more likely 
to occur between firms from countries that are trade partners.  
In  univariate  comparisons  of  pre-merger  performance  between  bidders  and  targets,  acquirers 
outperform targets by all measures. The country-level stock return of the acquirer in local currency is 
0.3% higher during the 12 months, 0.92% during the 24 months, and 2.12% during the 36 months before 
the deal occurs. Similarly, the exchange rate of the acquirer tends to appreciate relative to that of the 
target before the deal, 1.12%, 2.13% and 3.43% in the 12, 24 and 36 months before the deal, respectively. 
Given these results, not surprisingly, the market-to-book ratio of the acquirers‟ countries is 9.93% higher 
at the time of the deal. This pattern holds for both private and public acquirers and targets.   
When we restrict the sample to public acquirers and targets to compare firm-level returns, we 
again find that acquirers outperform targets prior to the acquisitions. The difference in firm-level stock 
returns in local currency is 10.38%, 19.34%, and 23.36% for 12, 24 and 36 months prior to the acquisition, 
respectively.  In  addition,  the  average  market-to-book  ratio  is  higher  for  acquirers  than  for  targets, 
mirroring prior findings for domestic mergers (see Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005)). 
We estimate multivariate models predicting the number of cross-border deals for particular pairs 
of countries. Our results suggest that differences in country-level stock returns in local currency as well as 
exchange  rate  returns  predict  the  volume  of  mergers  between  particular  country  pairs.  In  addition, 
differences  in  country-level  market-to-book  ratios  affect  cross-border  merger  volume  as  well.   3 
Quantitatively, our estimates imply that a two standard deviation increase in the real exchange rate return 
between acquirer and target countries over the prior 12-month period (34%) is associated with an increase 
of 22% in the expected number of acquisitions for a particular country pair. Similarly, a two standard 
deviation change in the country-level stock return difference over the prior 12-month period (54%) leads 
to an increase of 12% in the expected number of acquisitions by the better-performing country‟s firms of 
the  worse  performing  country‟s  firms.  Finally,  a  two  standard-deviation  change  in  the  country-level 
market-to-book difference for a given country pair (1.4) leads to an increase of 9.4% in the expected 
number  of  acquisitions  by  the  higher  market-to-book  country‟s  firms  of  the  lower  market-to-book 
country‟s firms. 
We consider the types of mergers for which stock-market and currency valuation differences 
appear to be important as merger motives. Our results suggest that currency movements are significant 
factors affecting mergers mostly between country pairs that are in the same region, except for the public 
firm sample. Also currency movements appear to be particularly important when the acquiring firm‟s 
country is wealthier than the target firm‟s country. This pattern suggests that firms in wealthier countries 
purchase firms in poorer nearby countries when the targets are relatively inexpensive following currency 
depreciation. We also find that valuation differences in country-level stock market predict mergers mostly 
when the acquiring country is wealthier than the target, consistent with the view that firms in wealthier 
countries purchase foreign firms following a decline in the poorer country‟s stock market. 
There are two potential (though not mutually exclusive) explanations for the preacquisition stock 
return differences between acquirer and targets. First, returns can affect the relative wealth of the two 
countries. Froot and Stein (1991) argue that when differences in wealth occur because of exchange rate or 
other shocks, they can exacerbate or lessen information asymmetry problems, thus changing the cost of 
capital for acquisitions. A wealthier country effectively has a lower cost of capital, leading its firms to 
purchase assets outside the country, including other companies. More generally, international acquisitions 
provide a way in which newly wealthier shareholders can increase their exposure internationally without 
purchasing foreign stocks.   4 
Second, returns can reflect differential divergence from fundamentals (see Shleifer and Vishny 
(2003), Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson and Teoh (2006), Rhodes-Kropf  and Viswanathan (2004), and 
Baker, Foley and Wurgler (2009)). Given misvaluation, managers of a relatively overvalued firm will 
have incentives to purchase relatively undervalued assets, especially  if they can use their overvalued 
stocks as a means of payment. In an international context, this divergence from fundamentals could occur 
for two reasons: First, overall investor sentiment could vary across countries, creating a wedge in firm 
values in the local currency across countries. Second, the currencies that the companies are trading in can 
appreciate or depreciate more than is warranted by changes in underlying economic conditions, leading 
the companies to be relatively misvalued.  
We use an approach suggested by Baker,  Foley  and Wurgler (2009) to differentiate the two 
explanations. In particular, we estimate an equation decomposing a country‟s market-to-book ratio using 
future returns. Baker et al. (2009) suggest that the fitted values from such a regression should reflect 
overvaluation while the residuals reflect a wealth effect. We find evidence consistent with the wealth 
effect,  which  is  strong  in  magnitude  and  persistent  across  different  sub-samples,  rather  than  the 
mispricing effect. 
We  then  examine  at  the  deal  level  whether  valuation  differences  drive  cross-border  M&As 
controlling for firm-specific factors. We find that differences in firm-level stock returns (in a common 
currency) are associated with higher likelihood of cross-border deal compared to domestic deals. We 
further decompose valuation differences between acquiring and target firms into three components: the 
differences in local stock market indices, the difference in returns of the two countries‟ currencies, and the 
differences in firm-level excess returns relative to the market. All three of these factors lead to a higher 
likelihood of a particular merger being cross-border than domestic, although statistical significance varies 
depending on the specification used.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the previous literature on 
cross-country mergers, including some relevant papers on FDI. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 
presents the results while Section 5 concludes.   5 
 
2. Prior literature on Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions 
Despite the fact that a large proportion of worldwide merger activity involves firms from different 
countries, the voluminous literature on mergers has focused primarily on domestic deals.
2 While this 
literature is also relevant to understanding international mergers, it does not address a number of factors 
related to country-based differences between firms. Nonetheless, there has been some work on cross -
border mergers, much of which either lumps together mergers with other international investments as FDI 
or considers solely mergers between public firms.
3 
Much of the earlier work on cross -border mergers focuses on synergies, marketing ability, or 
technological advantages to explain why a foreign firm would value domestic assets more  highly than 
would a domestic firm (see Graham and Krugman (1995) for a summary). Other factors proposed include 
trade tariff-jumping (Neary, 2007), tax incentives (Scholes and Wolfson, 1988, Swenson, 1994, Desai,  
Foley and Hines, 2001), and macroeconomic conditions. Empirical work focuses on explaining the 
general pattern that FDI flows from developed to less developed countries (e.g.  Cushman (1987) and 
Swenson (1994)).  
However, none of these studies provide theoretical justification for a relation between currency 
movements and cross-border mergers or other components of FDI. Froot and Stein (1991) suggest one 
such story, in which wealth effects matter because information problems in financial contra cting cause 
external financing to be more costly than internal financing. When a firm‟s value increases, so does its 
access to capital relative to alternative bidders whose value did not increase by as much. Consequently, 
when a potential foreign acquirer‟s value increases, for example through unhedged exchange rate changes 
or stock-market fluctuations, then the potential foreign acquirer can bid more aggressively for domestic 
                                                 
2 See Jensen and Ruback (1983), Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) and Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) for 
surveys.   
3 One recent study using a much more representative sample of mergers is Netter, Stegemoller, and Wintoki (2009), 
whose primary focus, unlike ours, is on domestic mergers.  These authors present evidence suggesting that filters 
that researchers commonly use in obtai ning M&A data lead to samples containing a small subset of the entire 
mergers universe, usually oversampling of larger transactions by publicly-held companies.   6 
assets than domestic rival bidders. In equilibrium, relative value changes lead to an increase in cross-
border acquisitions by firms in the relatively wealthy country. Because this explanation for a relation 
between currency movements and cross-border mergers is based on asymmetric information, it is likely to 
be particularly relevant in the case of private targets, for which asymmetric information tends to be high 
relative to otherwise similar public targets.
4 
An alternative explanation for the relation between price levels and cross -border mergers stems 
from differential mispricing of stocks between countries. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) develop a model in 
which managers of an overvalued acquir er issue shares at inflated prices to buy assets, ideally, an 
undervalued or at least a less overvalued target. This transaction transfers value to the shareholders of the 
acquiring firm by arbitraging the price difference between the firms‟ stock prices.  This model seems 
particularly  applicable  in  an  international  setting,  since  differences  in  valuation  are  likely  to  occur 
because of either movements in exchange rates or stock prices.
5  
Baker et al. (2009) provide a direct test of the  Froot and Stein (1991) wealth hypothesis and the 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) mispricing hypothesis. These authors consider the way in which relative price 
levels affect FDI inflows and outflows to the United States. An important issue in this analysis is the fact 
that most FDI purchases are of real assets or private companies, which are not  directly affected by stock 
price valuations. Baker et al. (2009) argue that the mispricing channel could nonetheless operate, even 
without new public equity issuances. If overvalued equity reduces the cost of debt by its effects on 
perceived collateral values and through widely-used credit-rating models, then an overpriced stock market 
could increase private firms‟ access to capital. Using data on U.S. FDI, Baker et al. (2009) find support 
for both the wealth and mispricing hypotheses.  
                                                 
4 The prediction that FDI increases following exchange rate movements has been tested by Klein and Rosengren 
(1994), Dewenter (1995) and Klein, Peek and Rosengren (2002), all of whom focus on FDI inflows and outflows 
from the United States. 
5 A similar argument based on rational stock movements has been proposed by Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan 
(2004).  Using  a  sample  of  U.S.  domestic  mergers,  Rhodes-Kropf,  Robinson  and  Viswanathan  (2005)  provide 
empirical support for these arguments.  
   7 
There has been some recent work on cross-border mergers that has mostly studied publicly-traded 
firms, and has focused on reasons for mergers other than valuation, such as corporate governance, foreign 
institutional ownership and the formation of the European Union. Rossi and Volpin (2004), Bris and 
Cabolis (2008) and Bris, Brisley, and Cabolis (2008) all consider governance-related explanations: Rossi 
and Volpin (2004) construct country-pair samples based on deals involving public firms and find that 
differences  in  investor  protection  affect  the  incidence  of  cross-border  deals.  Firms  in  countries  with 
weaker protection tend to be targets of firms from countries with stronger protection, presumably because 
the better investor protection provides an incremental source of value. Similarly, Bris and Cabolis (2008) 
find that the better the shareholder protection and accounting standards in the acquirer‟s country, the 
higher the merger premium in cross-border mergers relative to matching domestic acquisitions, while Bris, 
Brisley and Cabolis (2008) find that the Tobin‟s Q of an industry increases when firms within the industry 
are acquired by foreign firms coming from countries with better corporate governance.  
Chari, Ouimet and Tesar (2009) find that acquirers from developed markets experience positive 
and significant abnormal returns when targeting firms in emerging markets. Developed-market acquirers 
benefit more with weaker contracting environments in emerging markets and in industries with high asset 
intangibility.  Kumar  and  Ramchand  (2008)  find  evidence  suggesting  that  the  international  takeover 
market improves corporate governance standards across countries. Ferreira, Massa and Matos (2009) find 
that  foreign  institutional  ownership  is  positively  associated  with  the  intensity  of  cross-border  M&A 
activity worldwide, which could occur for a number of reasons, including foreign ownership facilitating 
the transfer, foreign ownership being correlated with more professionally managed companies, or foreign 
owners being more likely to sell to foreign buyers than local owners. Finally, Coeurdacier, DeSantis and 
Aviat (2009) use a database on bilateral cross-border M&As at the sector level (in manufacturing and 
services) over the period 1985-2004, and find that institutional and financial developments, especially the 
European Integration process, promote cross-border mergers and acquisitions.   
 
     8 
3. Data 
Our analysis relies on Security Data Corporation‟s (SDC) Mergers and Corporate Transactions 
database for data on mergers and acquisitions announced between 1990 and 2007 and completed by the 
end  of  2007.  We  exclude  LBOs,  spin-offs,  recapitalizations,  self-tender  offers,  exchange  offers, 
repurchases, partial equity-stake purchases, acquisitions of remaining interest, and privatizations, as well 
as  deals  in  which  the  target  or  the  acquirer  is  a  government  agency,  or  in  the  financial  or  utilities 
industry.
6 After excluding these deals, we end up with a sample of 187,841 mergers covering 48 countries, 
with the total transaction value of $7.54 trillion, 56,978 of which are cross -border with total transaction 
value of $2.21 trillion.
7 
We use Datastream to acquire data on monthly firm-level and country-level stock returns as well 
as exchange rate returns.
8 We calculate real returns by deflating our return indices using 1990 constant 
consumer price index (CPIi,t).
9 When calculating exchange rate returns for the Economic and Monet ary 
Union (EMU) countries, we use Euro as their currency post 1999 and deflate it using corresponding CPI 
for EMU countries. Thus, all EMU countries after 1999 have the same exchange rate movement. 
We obtain country-level controls from a number of sources.  We use ratings  on the quality of 
accounting disclosure from the 1990 annual report of the Center for International Financial Analysis and 
Research as well as a newly assembled anti-self dealing index from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer  (DLLS, 2008).
10 Our culture variables, language (English, Spanish or Others) and religion 
(Protestant, Catholic, Muslim, Buddhist or Others), are from Stulz and Williamson (2003). We control for 
                                                 
6 We only include countries that have consistent stock market data during 1990 and 2007. The number of deals 
(value) dropped due to lack of information on stock market return is 4,061 ($145 billion), approximately 2% (1.9%) 
of the sample. 
7 About 55% of the transactions do not have a reported deal value on SDC. Consequently, the reported value of 
M&A activity substantially understates its true value (see Netter, Stegemoller and Wintoki, 2009.)  
8 The exchange rate quote is the national exchange rates from the WM/Reuters, which are based on 4:00pm London 
(Greenwich Mean Time) in U.K. Pound Sterling. 
9 For Australia and New Zealand,  we  only have quarterly prices. When extrapolating to monthly  prices  using 
Natural (or simple) Spline Fitting method (to smooth out the prices), we assume that the prices are as of the end of 
month/quarter. 
10 Throughout the paper, we also use the shareholder protection index, computed as the product of rule of law and 
anti-director rights indices (DLLS, 2008), as an alternative proxy for legal protection.    9 
the level of corruption and political risk using measures from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009).
11 
We obtain annual Gross National Product (in U.S. dollars) normalized by population and annual real 
growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product from the World Development Indicator report. The data on tax 
rates are from OECD (average corporate income-tax rates) and Tax Analysts (whether there exists a tax 
treaty between a country pair)  while the data on bilateral trade flows are from the  United Nation 
Commodity Trade Statistics database (see Ferreira, Massa and Matos (2009)). Finally, we use a survey -
based variable that measures the average   level of trust that citizens from each country have toward 
citizens of other countries, constructed by Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009).  
For the public firms in our M&A sample, we obtain accounting and ownership information from 
Worldscope/Datastream. In particular, we use firm size (book value of total assets), book leverage (long-
term debt divided by total assets), cash ratio (cash holdings divided by total assets), two -year geometric 
sales growth, and return on equity as well as the market-to-book ratio of the equity. To calculate country-
level market-to-book ratio, we follow Fama and French (1998) and sum the market value of all equity for 
all public firms in a country and divide it by the sum of their book values. 
 
4. Results  
4.1. Stylized Facts about Cross-Border Mergers 
  Mergers involving acquirers and targets from different countries are substantial, in terms of both 
absolute number, and as a fraction of worldwide M&A activity. Figure 1 plots the value of cross-border 
deals  over  our  sample  period.  The  volume  of  cross-border  mergers  increases  throughout  the  1990s 
peaking in 2000, declines after the stock market crash of 2000, and increases again from 2002 until 2007. 
As a fraction of the total value of worldwide mergers, cross-border mergers typically amount to between 
20 and 40 percent (see the solid line). The fraction of cross-border deals follows the overall level of the 
                                                 
11 Fan, Morck, Xu and Yeung (2009), Smarzynska and Wei (2000), and  Wheeler and Mody (1992) document that 
high corruption is associated with lower level of FDI inflows.   10 
stock market; the fraction drops in the early 1990s, increases in the later 1990s to a peak in 2000, and then 
increases again with the stock market between 2004 and 2007. 
  Table  1  characterizes  the  pattern  of  cross-country  acquisitions  in  our  sample.  The  columns 
represent the countries of the acquiring companies while the rows represent those of the target companies.  
The diagonal entries of the matrix are therefore the number of domestic mergers for a particular country 
and the off-diagonal entries are the number of deals involving firms from a particular pair of countries.  
The totals reported in the bottom row and rightmost column exclude domestic mergers. Hence, these 
totals represent the number of cross-border mergers to and from a particular country.  The country with 
the largest number of acquisitions is the U.S.; U.S. firms were acquirers in 15,034 cross-border mergers 
and were targets in 11,886 cross-border mergers. These numbers are substantial but do not represent the 
majority of the 56,978 cross-border mergers. 
  A casual glance at Table 1 indicates that geography clearly matters. For every country, domestic 
mergers outnumber deals with any other country. Of the cross-border mergers, there is a large tendency to 
purchase  companies  in  nearby  countries.  For  example,  of  the  226  cross-border  acquisitions  by  New 
Zealand companies, over two-thirds, 145, were of Australian companies.  By far the largest target of 
Hong Kong based companies were Chinese companies (214 of 633 cross-border acquisitions of Hong 
Kong companies), and aside from the U.S., the vast majority of German cross-border acquisitions were 
from other European companies. 
  Table 2 reports deal characteristics by target country (Panel A) and acquirer country (Panel B) 
respectively, documenting for each the number of deals involving public firms, firms in related industries, 
and firms in the same region. The percentage of public acquirers across target countries does not have a 
large  variation,  with  the  percentage  of  public  acquirers  ranging  from  56%  (Croatia)  to  92%  (Peru). 
However there is a large cross-sectional variation in the percentage of regional deals. In some countries, 
especially within Europe (Norway, Peru, Austria, Portugal, Luxembourg and Croatia), at least 80% of 
purchasers of firms from those countries are from the same region while in others (South Africa, Russia, 
Israel, and Japan), fewer than 10% are. In terms of acquirers, there is a large variation in the percentage of   11 
public acquirers across countries. For example, the Czech Republic has no public firms acquiring foreign 
corporations while almost 90% of the Israeli firms acquiring foreign corporations are public. 
4.2.  Cross-Sectional Determinants of Cross-Border Mergers 
  To  analyze  the  cross-sectional  patterns  among  acquirers  and  targets  formally,  we  use  a 
multivariate regression framework. Our goal is to measure the factors affecting the propensity of firms of 
one country to acquire firms of another. Following Rossi and Volpin (2004)  and Ferreira, Massa and 
Matos (2009), we construct a variable that equals the number of acquisitions by firms in one country of 
firms in the second at any point during the sample period for each (ordered) country pair. We normalize 
this variable by the total number of domestic acquisitions in the target country, implicitly controlling for 
factors that will influence the volume of both domestic deals and cross-border deals.
12  
We estimate equations explaining this variable as a function of the characteristics of the countries. 
Since  each  observation  is  a  “country  pair”  and  we  have  37  countries,  the  total  number  of  potential 
observations is 1332 (37×36
 ).
13 We then break down the full sample  into subsamples into one in which 
either the acquirer or target (or both) is private, and one in which the acquirer and target are each publicly 
traded. We include the average stock return difference of the country indices over the sample period for 
each country pair (measured in local currency), as well as the relative appreciation of the two countries‟ 
currencies over the sample period (the average annual real exchange rate return) because, as we have 
argued above, changes  in relative valuation  likely  lead to  acquisitions. Because regulatory and  legal 
differences  between  countries  are  factors  that  potentially  affect  cross-border  acquisitions  (Rossi  and 
Volpin (2004), we include as independent variables the difference in the index on the quality of their 
disclosure of accounting information, as well as the difference in a newly assembled anti-self dealing 
index taken from DLLS (2008).  
                                                 
12 Note that the pairs are ordered, so that, for example, there would be a U.S.-Canada dummy variable as well as a 
Canada-U.S. dummy variable in each equation. 
13 In addition, we impose the requirement that a country pair has at least one deal during the sample period, which 
reduces the total number of observations to 1036.  We also estimate our equations without this requirement and also 
by imposing stricter requirements that each country -pair must have at least 5 or 10 cross -border deals during the 
sample period.  The results from these alternative specifications are qualitatively similar to those presented here.    12 
To capture the regional effect discussed above, we include Great Circle Distance between the 
capital cities of two countries in the equation.
14 Since a common culture potentially makes mergers more 
likely, we include a dummy variable set equal to one if the target and acquirer share a primary religion, 
and a second dummy variable set equal to one if they share a primary language. Each equation contains 
the difference in the log of gross national product in 1990 U.S. dollars divided by the population, as well 
as the average annual real growth rate of the gross domestic product from 1990 to 2007 to control for 
macroeconomic conditions. Since cross-border mergers in part occur because of synergies, the existence 
of which is likely correlated with the quantity of business done between the two countries, we include a 
measure of bilateral trade flow between these countries, calculated as the value of imports by the target 
firm‟s country from the acquirer firm‟s country as a fraction of total imports by the target firm‟s country. 
To consider the possibility of tax motives for mergers, we include average corporate income tax rates in 
1990 and a dummy variable indicating whether there exists a tax treaty between a country pair in 2007. 
Because of the importance of relationships between the parties in a merger and the fact that cross-country 
relationships are depending on country-specific histories, the specification includes a variable constructed 
by Guiso et al. (2009) that supposedly measures the average level of trust that citizens from each country 
have toward citizens of country pair (see Ahearn et al. (2010) for more discussion on this point). Finally, 
each equation contains dummy variables for each acquirer country. 
Table 3 contains estimates of this equation. Columns 1-5 include all deals, Columns 6-10 restrict 
the sample to deals involving either a private acquirer or target, while Columns 11-15 include only deals 
with  both  public  acquirers  and  targets.  These  estimates  indicate  that  there  are  a  number  of  patterns 
characterizing the identity of acquirers and targets. First, the regional effect discussed above is evident; 
holding other things constant, the shorter the distance between two countries, the more likely there are 
                                                 
14 We obtain latitude and longitude of capital cities of each country from www.mapsofworld.com. We then apply the 
standard formula: 3963.0 * arcos [sin(lat1) *  sin(lat2) + cos (lat1) * cos (lat2) * cos (lon2 - lon1)], where lon and lat 
are the longitudes and latitudes of the acquirer and the target country locations, respectively.    13 
acquisitions between firms in these countries.
15 Second, there is a currency effect; firms from countries 
whose currencies appreciated over the sample period  are more likely to be purchasers of firms whose 
currency depreciated. Third, consistent with Rossi and Volpin (2004), having a higher quality accounting 
disclosure system increases the likelihood that firms from a country will be purchasers of firms from 
another country. Fourth, larger differences in corporate income taxes rates attract foreign i nvestment. 
Finally, the existence of a tax treaty negatively affects the likelihood of a cross-border merger. There is no 
evidence that sharing a common language or religion , or the quantity of trust between nations (at least 
given the measure we use) has any impact on merger propensities. 
4.3. Differences in Valuation Using Country-Level Panel Data: Univariate Evidence 
  Table 4 summarizes the valuation differences between acquirers and targets.  As measures of 
valuation, we report differences in market-to-book ratios, differences in real exchange rate returns, and 
differences in real stock returns in local currency prior to the acquisition, both at the country and firm 
levels. We report the country-level stock returns, the firm-level stock returns, and currency returns for one, 
two and three year intervals prior to the acquisition.   
  The first column presents these return differences for the entire sample of cross-border mergers. 
For both the level of valuation (market-to-book ratio) and the recent change in valuation (local stock 
market returns as well as exchange rate appreciation), acquirers are more highly valued than targets. The 
market-to-book ratio averages almost 10% higher for acquiring countries than for target countries. In 
addition, the average local stock market returns are higher for acquiring firm countries than target firm 
countries, by 0.3% in the year prior to the merger, 0.92% in the two-year period prior to the merger and 
by 2.12% in the three-year period prior to the merger. Finally, the exchange rate of acquiring companies 
appreciates relative to that of the target companies, by 1.12% in the year prior to the acquisition, by 
2.13% in the two-year period and 3.43% in the three-year period prior to the acquisition. All of these 
                                                 
15 This result parallels those from a growing literature on the effect of geography in domestic acquisitions. For 
example, Kedia, Panchapagesan and Uysal (2009) find that in domestic acquisitions, acquirers experience higher 
returns when they are geographically closer to targets, potentially due to better information sharing between firms 
that are closer to one another.     14 
results are consistent with the view that firms purchase firms when they are relatively highly valued, 
either because of a wealth effect or to take advantage of overvaluation. 
  For the subsample of mergers for which the acquirers and targets are both publicly traded and 
hence have observable stock returns, acquirers substantially outperform targets prior to the acquisitions. 
The differences are much larger than the country-level differences, about 10% in the year prior to the 
acquisition, 19% in the two-year period prior to the acquisition and 23% in the three-year period prior to 
the acquisition. This relation is again consistent with the valuation arguments and is similar to what others 
have  found  for  domestic  acquisitions  (see  Rhodes-Kropf,  Robinson  and  Viswanathan  (2005),  Dong, 
Hirshleifer, Richardson and Teoh (2006), and Harford (2005)). 
  This pattern can be clearly seen  in Panel  A of  Figure 2. Prior the month of the acquisition, 
differences in both the local currency stock returns and exchange rate return are positive, meaning that the 
stock market of the acquirer‟s country outperformed the target country‟s and that the acquirer‟s currency 
appreciated relative to the target‟s during the three  years prior to the acquisition. Subsequent to the 
acquisition, however, the stock return difference disappears,  implying that the target  country‟s stock 
market outperforms the acquirer‟s during the three years subsequent to the acquisition. However, the 
acquirer‟s currency continues to appreciate, leaving the common-currency returns in the two countries‟ 
stock markets approximately the same following the acquisitions. The post-acquisition appreciation of the 
acquirer‟s currency relative to the target‟s probably  reflects the composition of acquirers and targets; 
acquirers are more  likely than targets to be from developed economies and over the sample period, 
developed economies‟ currencies tended to appreciate relative to those of developing countries. This 
pattern  emphasizes  the  importance  of  controlling  for  country-pair  effects  econometrically  when 
estimating the determinants of cross-border merger propensities (as we do below). 
  We  break  down  the  pre-acquisition  returns  by  characteristics  of  the  deals  in  the  remaining 
columns of Table 4. The second through fifth columns consider deals by whether the acquirer and target 
are  from  developing  or  developed  countries,  using  the  World  Bank  definition  of  “high  income”   15 
economies.
16 The pre-acquisition local return differences are positive for each category, although they are 
substantially larger when a developed acquirer buys a   developing target (12.79%  difference in pre-
acquisition returns) than when a developing acquirer buys a developed target (9.54%   difference). 
However the currency movements prior to the deal go in opposite directions for these two categories. 
When a developing acquirer buys a developed target the acquirer‟s currency actually depreciates prior to 
the acquisition (-23.32% pre-acquisition exchange rate difference). On the other hand, when a developed 
acquirer buys a developing target, it generally follows a period of strong relative appreciation (24.22% 
difference). This pattern could reflect a general appreciation of currencies in developed countries relative 
to developing ones over our sample period and emphasizes the importance of controlling for these effects 
econometrically. 
  In Columns 6-9 of Table 4, we break down the pre-acquisition valuation differences by the legal 
regime prevailing in the acquiring and target countries. We classify a country as a weak-law country if the 
anti-self dealing index (DLLS, 2008) is below the median. In general, targets in weak-law countries are 
associated with higher pre-acquisition differences in market-to-book ratios, local currency stock returns, 
and  exchange  rate  returns,  especially  when  the  acquirer  is  from  a  strong  law  country.  This  pattern 
suggests that governance-driven cross-border acquisitions characterized by Rossi and Volpin (2004) tend 
to  occur  during  times  when  the  target  company‟s  country  is  doing  relatively  poorly.  The  potential 
governance improvements from the stronger legal protection appear to be supplemented by a valuation 
effect. 
  In the final four columns of Table 4, we break down the valuation differences by whether the 
acquirer and target are from the same region of the world, and also by whether mergers are related or 
                                                 
16 It is not obvious how one should define countries as developing or developed. We also use (but do not report) an 
alternative definitions from Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001): If both claims on private sector by deposit money 
banks as a share of GDP and the total value traded on the stock market as a share of GDP in a given country are 
below period mean, the country is flagged as “developing.” The pattern of pre-acquisition returns remains similar.   16 
diversifying mergers.
17 In general the valuation metrics are similar regardless of whether the acquirer and 
target are in the same region or not. However, the valuation differences tend to be somewhat larger for 
related mergers than for diversifying mergers for most of the valuation measures we use. 
4.4. Differences in Valuation Using Country-Level Panel Data: Multivariate Evidence 
  To formally evaluate the hypothesis that relative valuation can affect merger propensities, we rely 
on a multivariate framework that controls for other potentially relevant factors. It is not obvious, however, 
what the most natural approach is to address this question. One possibility is to use deal level data on the 
acquirer and target‟s market valuations. This approach has the advantage of utilizing the most accurate 
measure of firm values in the comparison. However, it has the disadvantage of only being usable for the 
subsample of public acquirers and public targets. As discussed above, the vast majority of cross-border 
acquisitions  have  either  private  acquirers  or  targets  (or  both),  so  using  deal-level  data  necessitates 
discarding the vast majority of the sample. An alternative approach relies on country-level data. This 
approach has the disadvantage of ignoring firm-level information (where available) but has the advantage 
of being able to utilize the entire sample of deals. In addition, a number of hypotheses of interest, in 
particular those concerning currency movements and country-level stock market movements, are testable 
using country-level data. Since each approach has both advantages and disadvantages, we use both: We 
first estimate  equations using the entire sample of deals using country-level data on market  indices, 
valuation levels, and exchange rates. We then estimate equations with deal-level data on the smaller 
sample of deals involving public acquirers and targets.   
  We rely on a specification in which the dependent variable is the number of deals between a 
particular country pair, normalized by the total number of domestic deals in the target country in a given 
year. Our sample consists of country pairs with one observation per year for each pair, for a total of 
14,200 observations. To control for the cross-sectional factors discussed above as well as long-term trends 
in currency movements that affect merger propensities (Table 3), we include country-pair fixed effects. 
                                                 
17 If the target and acquirer‟s countries are from the same broadly-defined continent (Africa, America, Asia, and 
Europe), the deal is classified as „same region‟ (Source: World Atlas 1995) and is considered to be „related‟ if the 
target firm and the acquiring firm share a three-digit SIC code.   17 
This specification allows us to exploit time-series variation in relative valuations while controlling for 
cross-country differences.  
  Panel  of  Table  5  A  presents OLS  estimates  of  this  equation.  The  stock  return  and  currency 
differences are measured over the 12 months prior to the year in question, so that “(Currency R12)j-i” is 
the difference in the past 12-month real exchange rate return between the acquirer (indexed by j) and the 
target country (indexed by i), “(Market R12)j-i” is the difference in the past 12-month real stock-market 
return in the local currency between the acquirer and the target country, and “(Market MTB)j-i” is the 
difference  in  the  value-weighted  market-to-book  equity  ratio  between  the  acquirer  and  the  target 
country.
18 All equations also include differences in the log of GDP, the differences in GDP growth rates, 
the quantity of bilateral trade between the two countries, as well as year and country -pair dummies. 
Columns 1-6 present estimates including all deals, Columns 7 -12 restrict the sample to deals  involving 
either a private acquirer or target, while Columns 13-18 include only public acquirers and targets.
19 
  Columns 1, 7 and 13 present the basic regression for each group of deals. The coefficients on the 
stock and currency return differences are positive and statistically significantly different from zero in each 
equation except those estimated on the public firms subsample. These positive coefficients on the 
valuation differences imply  that when valuations are higher in one country than another, the expected 
number of acquisitions by the first country‟s firms of the second country‟s firms increases. The estimated 
coefficients reported in Column 1 imply that a two standard deviation increase in the real exchange rate 
change for a given country pair (34%) is associated with an increase of 22% in the expected number of 
acquisitions of firms in countries with relatively depreciated currency.
 20 Similarly, they imply that a two 
standard deviation change in the country-level stock return difference for a given country pair (54%) 
                                                 
18 We have also estimated these equations using 24-month and 36-month stock and currency returns prior to the 
acquisition with similar results. In addition, we have estimated these equations on U.S. and non-U.S. subsamples, 
again with results similar to those reported in Table 5. 
19 We restrict the sample to those country-pairs with at least one merger at some point during the sample period. We 
have estimated these equations using samples including all country pairs, as well as only those country pairs with at 
least 10 mergers over the entire sample. In each case the results are similar to those reported in Table 5. 
20 The average ratio of cross-border merger to domestic mergers for a given country-pair in a given year is 0.0461. 
Given the coefficient of the country-level 12 month real exchange rate return between target and acquirer country 
from Column (1) of Table 5 (0.030), the percentage change in the ratio for an average country pair for a t wo 
standard deviation change in exchange rate returns equals (0.030*34%)/0.0461=22%.   18 
leads to an increase of 12% in the expected number of acquisitions by the better-performing country‟s 
firms of the worse performing country‟s firms.
21  
  Columns 2, 8 and 14 of Panel A of Table 5 break up the local market and currency returns by a 
dummy variable which equals 1 if the GDP per capita in the acquirer country is larger than that in the 
target country, while Columns 3, 9 and 15 perform a similar decomposition for regional differences. The 
estimates reported in these columns indicate that both the stock and currency return differences have the 
largest impact on merger propensities when firms from wealthier countries are considering purchasing 
firms from poorer countries. Also, the regional decomposition indicates that the currency effect is the 
largest for country pairs in the same region, except for the public firms subsample. However, the stock 
market  effect  is  positive  and  statistically  significant  for  out-of-region  deals  and  it  is  statistically 
indistinguishable from zero for mergers within a region. 
  Columns 4, 10 and 16 consider how country-level differences in market-to-book ratios affect 
merger likelihoods. The coefficients on the market to book differences are again positive and statistically 
significantly different from zero, except for the public firm subsample. The estimates imply that a two 
standard deviation increase in the market-to-book difference for a given country pair (1.44) is associated 
with an increase of 9.4% in the expected volume of cross-border mergers.
22  
We break down the impact of country-level market-to-book ratio differences on mergers by the 
relative wealth of the countries and by the regional differences in the remaining columns of Table 5, Panel 
A.  These  results  suggest  that,  consistent  with  the  results  using  returns  and  currencies,  valuation 
differences are most important when firms from wealthier countries purchase firms from poorer countries. 
These results suggest that valuation effects in cross -border mergers are most important for firms from 
                                                 
21 The average ratio of cross-border merger to domestic mergers for a given country-pair in a given year is 0.0461. 
Given the coefficient of the country-level 12 month real stock return difference in Column (1) of Table 5 (0.011), 
the percentage change in the ratio for a two standard deviation change in stock return differences equals 
(0.011*54%)/0.0461=12%. 
22 The average ratio of cross-border merger to domestic mergers for a given country-pair in a given year is 0.0461. 
Given the coefficient of the country-level market-to-book difference between target and acquirer in Column (4) of 
Table 5 (0.003), the percentage change in the ratio for a two standard deviation change in the market to book ratio 
for an average country pair equals (0.003*1.44)/0.0461=9.4%.   19 
wealthier countries, whose companies are likely to purchase firms from poorer countries following a 
decrease in their market-to-book ratio.  
If  some  acquisitions  are  motivated  by  valuation  differences,  while  others  are  motivated  by 
synergies, then it seems plausible that the synergy-motivated acquisitions are more likely to be between 
two  firms  in  the  same  industry,  while  the  valuation-motivated  mergers  are  more  likely  to  be  across 
industries. To evaluate this possibility, we separate our sample into across-industry and within-industry 
mergers  and  reestimate  the  equations  in  Panel  A  using  the  number  of  a  particular  type  of  merger, 
normalized by the number of domestic mergers of the same type,  in a particular  country-pair as the 
dependent variable. The results (not reported) are similar to those in Panel A of Table 5. The coefficients 
for the diversifying mergers are larger in absolute value, but both sets are significantly different from zero 
and are not significantly different from each other.
23 
A maintained assumption so far is that the only relevant factor determining valuation -based 
mergers is the difference in whichever valuation metric is being considered (currency movements, stock 
returns,  or  market-to-book  ratios).  It  is  possible  that  these  mergers  could  reflect  value  changes  of 
acquirers and targets differentially. For example, if value-driven mergers occur because of a stock market 
bubble in one country that does not occur to the same extent in others, then we should expect that the 
primary factor explaining the merger propensities would be the acquirer‟s valuation. Alternatively, if 
these mergers occur because of financial crises leading to large stock market and currency devaluations, 
then we expect the primary factor to be the target‟s valuation. 
We consider these issues in Panel B of Table 5, which presents estimates of similar models to 
those in Panel A, except that the stock returns, exchange rate return, and market-to-book equity ratio of 
the target country and acquirer country are included into the equation separately.  As in Panel A, all 
                                                 
23 Another possibility is that valuation-motivated mergers are more likely to be stock-financed and that synergy-
motivate mergers are more likely to be cash-financed. Ideally, one could reestimate the Table 5 equations for each 
type of acquisition and compare the coefficients across types. However, information on the method of payment is 
missing for more than half the observations in the SDC sample, so we cannot perform this type of analysis on our 
sample. 
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equations include differences in the log of GDP, the differences in GDP growth rates, the quantity of 
bilateral trade between the two countries, as well as year and country-pair dummies. Columns 1-6 present 
estimates for the entire sample, while Columns 7-12 restrict the sample to deals involving either a private 
acquirer or target, while the estimates in Columns 13-18 include only public acquirers and targets. 
The results presented in Panel B of Table 5 suggest that target countries experience declining and 
acquirer  countries  experience  rising  valuation  in  their  stock  market,  especially  for  the  full  sample 
(Columns 1 and 4). When we further break up the stock market valuations based on the same-region 
dummy and the relative-wealth dummy, we find that the effect of the valuation is the most significant 
when the GDP per capita in the acquirer country is larger than that in the target country (Columns 2, 5, 8, 
11, 14, and 17). However the impact of exchange rate return differences on merger volume is mainly 
driven by the currency depreciation of the target countries but not by the changes in the currency of the 
acquirer countries (Columns 1, 7, and 14). When we further break up the exchange rate returns based on 
the same-region dummy and the relative-wealth dummy, we find that acquirers engage in cross-border 
mergers when their currency appreciates only with target firms in the same region (Columns 3, 9, and 15).  
4.5. Interpreting the Relation between Valuation and Merger Propensities  
  There are two possible explanations for the relation between valuation and merger propensities. 
Increases in relative valuation, either through stock price increases or currency appreciation, could reflect 
real  increases  in  wealth,  enhancing  firms‟  abilities  to  finance  acquisitions  (Froot  and  Stein  (1991)). 
Alternatively, the changes in relative valuation could reflect  errors  in valuation,  in which case firms 
should rationally take advantage of this misvaluation to purchase relatively cheap assets, i.e., firms in 
another country that are not as overvalued (Shleifer and Vishny (2003)). The overvaluation argument 
applies  mainly  to  public  acquirers  who  can  either  issue  equity  or  make  stock  acquisitions  to  take 
advantage of the high valuation, but as Baker et al. (2009) argue, it would potentially apply to private 
acquirers as well if the overvalued equity market lowers the cost of capital in a country for private firms. 
  A prediction of the incorrect relative valuation argument is that subsequent to acquisitions by 
relatively overvalued firms, there should be a price reversal and acquirers should underperform relative to   21 
targets. In particular, the overvaluation argument implies that if an acquirer purchases a target to arbitrage 
differences  in  the  price  levels  across  countries,  these  differences  should  narrow  subsequent  to  the 
acquisition. To evaluate this possibility, we include future return differences in Panel A of Table 6. The 
results are somewhat ambiguous, but seem to indicate that, if anything, the difference in currency returns 
tends to persist following the acquisition. This pattern is inconsistent with the notion that overvaluation 
explains the impact of valuation on merger decisions, although it is possible that the future returns tests 
are not particularly  powerful, as they only make use of the component of overvaluation that can be 
explained by future returns over a pre-specified interval. 
  To test this hypothesis formally, we follow an approach suggested by Baker et al. (2009). These 
authors argue that the market-to-book ratio can be broken into two components: the component due to 
real expected wealth and the component due to over or under reaction by the market to news. To estimate 
the magnitude of each component, Baker et al. (2009) estimate equations where the market-to-book ratio 
is a function of future stock returns. To the extent that the market-to-book ratio reflects overvaluation at 
the time of acquisitions, periods of high acquisitions should be followed by periods of poor returns. The 
“fitted” component of market-to-book should represent that component arising from overvaluation while 
the “residual” component comes from real wealth effects. 
  In the first-stage equation, where country-level market-to-book  ratios are regressed on future 
returns, the coefficients on future returns are negative. This finding is consistent with the literature that 
there is a negative relation between country-level market-to-book ratios and future stock returns in that 
country. However, when we break down the market-to-book differences between countries into “fitted” 
and  “residual”  components  (see  Panel  B  of  Table  6),  for  most  specifications,  only  the  residual  is 
positively related to the ratio of cross-border mergers, as predicted by the wealth-effect hypothesis. Only 
in the sample of acquisitions of private firms, for which stock market misvaluation is least likely to affect 
acquisitions, is the difference of the fitted values statistically significant. 
 In the sample of deals involving 
public targets and acquirers, the coefficient on the difference in fitted components is actually negative and 
statistically significant, which is the opposite of what the overvaluation hypothesis predicts. In unreported   22 
tables,  we  also  separately  examine  the  fitted  and  residual  market-to-book  components  of  target  and 
acquirer  to  further  test  the  overvaluation  hypothesis  against  real  wealth  effects.  We  find  that  the 
predictable component of acquirers‟ market-to-book negatively relates to investment flows to the target 
country,  opposite  to  what  the  overvaluation  hypothesis  predicts.  Further,  the  residual  component  of 
acquirer‟s market-to-book positively and significantly relates to investment flows, therefore providing 
support to the real wealth hypothesis. Taken as a whole, this evidence suggests that the valuation effect 
occurs because of the wealth effect described by Froot and Stein (1991) rather than the mispricing effect 
discussed by Shleifer and Vishny (2003). 
4.6. Differences in Valuation Using Deal-Level Panel Data 
  We have documented that valuation appears to play an important role in determining which firms 
are likely to merge. Acquirers tend to be valued relatively highly compared to targets, using prior returns 
or market-to-book ratios as measures of valuation. The difference in valuation between acquirers and 
targets appears to occur due to both stock market and currency effects. Yet, the results presented so far 
utilize country-level data. Consequently, they do not control for firm-level factors that potentially affect 
the decision to merge, including the firm‟s own valuation. 
  To control for firm-level factors, we consider the subsample of firms for which we have public 
data  on  both  acquirers  and  targets.  Unfortunately,  this  subsample  is  both  relatively  small  and 
unrepresentative of the overall sample of mergers, because firms in this subsample are much more likely 
to be from developed rather than developing countries. Of the 56,978 cross-border mergers in our sample, 
only 1,178 have both public acquirers and targets, and also have data available on firm-level variables we 
use to control for other factors that potentially affect mergers. Of these 1,178 mergers, 877 have acquirers 
from  developed  countries  and  780  targets  are  from  developed  countries.    While  these  mergers  are 
interesting in their own right, they are nonetheless not representative of cross-border mergers in general. 
  To estimate the factors that affect the likelihood of a merger, one would ideally like to consider 
every possible pair of firms that could conceivably merge and estimate the likelihood that any two of 
them actually do merge. Unfortunately, this  approach would be  infeasible as the number of possible   23 
combinations would be extremely large relative to the number of actual mergers. Instead, we adopt two 
alternative approaches, each of which allows us to draw inferences about the factors leading one firm to 
buy another.   
4.6.1. Cross-Border vs. Domestic Mergers 
  We first consider the sample of all mergers of publicly traded firms (including domestic ones), 
and estimate the characteristics of the firms involved with the merger that lead a particular merger to be 
either cross-border or domestic. We estimate logit models that predict whether an observed merger is 
domestic or cross-border as a function of deal characteristics. Intuitively, this approach presumes that 
domestic mergers can provide a benchmark for understanding the nature of cross-border mergers. 
  We present estimates of these equations in Table 7. The first two columns include the difference 
in the acquirer and target firm-level returns, converted to U.S. dollars, as an explanatory variable. Both 
coefficients are positive and in the second column, which controls for whether the two firms are in a 
related  industry and the sizes of the targets and acquirers, the coefficient  is statistically significantly 
different from zero. The positive coefficient indicates that cross-border acquisitions tend to have larger 
return differences between acquirers and targets. 
  In Columns 3 and 4 we break up the return differences into three components, the differences in 
local stock market indices, the difference in returns of the two countries‟ currencies, and the differences in 
firm-level excess returns relative to the market.
24 The coefficients on all three variables are positive, but 
often statistically insignificantly different from zero. The positive coefficients on the difference in 
currency returns and the difference in local market returns a re consistent with the valuation arguments 




                                                 
24 For the domestic deals, the differences in the local market returns and the currency returns equal zero by 
construction.   24 
4.6.2. Identity of the Target and the Acquirer 
  Another approach to evaluating the reasons for cross-border mergers is to consider the differences 
in the characteristics of targets and acquirers.  If the underlying reason for the merger is to take advantage 
of valuation differences, then one ought to be able to predict which firms will be acquirers or targets using 
measures of valuation. Consequently, we consider the sample consisting of all firms involved in a public-
to-public cross-border merger and estimate equations predicting whether a particular firm is a target or 
acquirer. Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, we estimate the equations by a logit model and 
present the results in Table 8. We estimate these equations for both domestic and cross-border mergers; 
the domestic mergers are in Columns 1-4 while the cross-border ones are in Columns 5-8. 
  The  results  in  Table  8  indicate  that  for  both  domestic  and  cross-border  mergers,  acquirers 
outperform targets prior to the acquisition. This finding is consistent with prior literature on domestic 
mergers suggesting that acquirers typically have higher valuations than targets. In Columns 7 and 8, we 
break down each return for the cross-border sample into three components, reflecting the local stock 
market  index (in  local  currency), the currency  return (relative to U.S. dollars), and the firm-specific 
residual in local currency. The results indicate that only the firm-specific component of returns is related 
to whether a firm is an acquirer or a target, not the local stock-market return or the currency return. These 
results are consistent with what we found at the country level using only public firms sample and similar 
to the deal-level regressions in Table 7 using the domestic/cross-border specification. The difference 
between the public firm subsample and the overall sample consisting mostly of private firms is consistent 
with the relative wealth story suggested by Froot and Stein (1991). The underlying cause of frictions in 
the Froot and Stein model is asymmentric information, which is likely to be higher in private firms than in 
public ones.  Consequently, if this channel leads to wealth effects in mergers, then it should be stronger in 
mergers involving private firms than in mergers of public firms, consistent with the findings reported in 
Table 8.  
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5. Conclusion   
About  one-third  of  worldwide  mergers  combine  firms  from  two  different  countries.  As  the 
world‟s economy becomes increasingly integrated, cross-border mergers are likely to become even more 
important in the future. Yet,  in the voluminous academic  literature on mergers, the vast majority of 
research has studied domestic deals. Moreover, what  little work that has been done on cross-border 
mergers has focused on public and/or U.S. based firms. Understanding the patterns and motivations for 
cross-border mergers is consequently an important and understudied research topic. 
In contrast to the presumptions of the academic  literature, most cross-border mergers do  not 
involve U.S. firms and do involve privately-held firms. In our sample of 56,978 cross-border mergers that 
occurred between 1990 and 2007, 97% involved a private firm as either acquirer or target, while 53% did 
not  involve  a  U.S.  firm.  Geography  matters;  the  odds  of  acquiring  a  firm  in  a  nearby  country  are 
substantially higher than the odds of acquiring a firm in a country far away. In addition, higher economic 
development, and better accounting quality are all associated with the likelihood of being an acquirer 
rather than a target. 
A major factor determining the pattern of cross-border mergers is currency movements. Over the 
entire sample period, countries whose currencies have appreciated are more likely to have acquiring firms 
while countries whose currencies have depreciated are more likely to have targeted firms. Controlling for 
these  overall  time  trends  econometrically,  short-term  movements  between  two  countries‟  currencies 
increase the likelihood that firms in the country with the appreciating currency purchase firms in the 
country with the depreciating currency. 
In addition, the relative stock market performance between two countries affects the propensity of 
firms in these countries to merge. Our estimates indicate that the greater the difference in stock market 
performance  between  the  countries,  the  more  likely  that  firms  in  the  superior-performing  country 
purchase firms in the worse-performing country. 
The impacts of currency movements and of stock market performance on merger propensities are 
likely  symptomatic  of  a  more  general  valuation  effect,  in  which  more  highly  valued  firms  tend  to   26 
purchase lower-valued firms. This effect has been documented for domestic acquisitions of U.S. firms in 
a number of studies, and has been generally attributed to misvaluation arguments (Shleifer and Vishny 
(2003), Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004)). Yet in an international context, there is an additional 
reason why higher-valued firms would purchase lower-valued firms; firms from wealthier countries will 
have a tendency to purchase firms from poorer countries because of a wealth effect due to a lower cost of 
capital (Froot and Stein (1991). We evaluate both the mispricing and wealth explanations econometrically 
and find support for the wealth explanation rather than the mispricing explanation. 
  With the increasing integration of the world economy, it is likely that more mergers will involve 
firms from different countries. We have provided a preliminary analysis of the patterns and reasons for 
cross-border mergers.  Some of these mergers undoubtedly occur for the same synergistic  reasons as 
domestic mergers. Yet others appear to reflect country-level factors such as currency appreciation and 
macroeconomic performance. The extent to which each type of factor affects the likelihood of firms to 
purchase one another is an important topic for future research.   27 
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Figure 1. Total value of cross-border mergers and acquisitions.  
This figure plots the value (ratio) of cross-border deals with deal value larger than $1 million between 
1990 and 2007. Bars represent values while the solid line represents the ratio of cross-border mergers in 
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Panel A.1 World Sample (# of obs: 51,488) 
 
 
   
 
Panel A.2 World Sample of Public Firms Only (# of obs: 1,304) 
 
 
Figure 2. Cumulative geometric differences in the real stock  return in local currency and real 
exchange rate return between the target and the acquirer.  
The horizontal axis denotes the months relative to the acquisition month (month 0). Panel A.1 depicts the 
world sample; Panel A.2 depicts the world sample with public firms only. Panel B uses world subsamples; 
Panel B.1 uses acquirers and targets from developing countries; Panel B.2 uses the sample of developing 
targets and developed acquirers; Panel B.3 uses the sample of developed targets and developing acquirers; 
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Table 1. Number of mergers and acquisitions across country pairs.  
The columns represent the countries of the acquiring companies while the rows represent those of the target companies. The diagonal entries of the matrix are 
therefore the number of domestic mergers for a particular country and the off-diagonal entries are the number of deals in a particular country pair. The totals 
exclude domestic mergers and hence represent the number of cross-border mergers to and from a particular country. Our sample period is from 1990 to 2007. 
  Acquirer Country   
Destination  AR AS  AU  BL BR  CA  CC CE CH CO CT CY  DN  FN  FR  GR HK HU ID IN  IR  IS  IT  JP  LX  MA  MX NO  NT  NZ PE PH  PL  PO RU SA SG SK  SP  SW  SZ  TH TK TW  UK  US  VE  WG  Total 
Argentina(AR)  201  1  4  4  30  42    13    1      5    57  1  1      2  6    17  4      16  1  28  3    1        2      54  5  14  1      58  243  4  22  640 
Austria(AS)    341  4  8    19  1            19  7  35  3  1  2    2  7  1  25  7  8    1  7  25        2  1    2  1    5  19  33    1    52  84    255  637 
Australia(AU)    3  4,875  7  2  145      1        20  7  62    43    5  16  24  6  8  69  2  51  1  10  64  145    5    1  1  58  75  5  5  40  47  2  1  2  430  812    63  2,238 
Belgium(BL)    7  13  494    12              21  12  169  4  1      9  16  2  17  24  5      9  206  1      1  3  1  6  1    9  30  18    1    148  197    79  1,022 
Brazil(BR)  40  3  14  9  565  48    15    4      14  6  94    3      6  8  8  41  18  6    19  9  28  3        35    4  5    52  16  22    1  1  58  388    60  1,038 
Canada(CA)  1  10  59  14  7  6,220  1    8        12  11  112  2  16    3  11  13  9  19  58  11  4  4  13  54  5  1  3      1  9  1  3  6  34  56      4  328  2,516  1  80  3,500 
Czech Republic(CC)    31  1  9  1  10  143        1    14  6  38  1  1  8    5  6  1  7  3  3      9  25        8    6  1      8  16  23        47  77    76  442 
Chile(CE)  6    14  1  4  39    101          1  1  8      1    1  1    4  1      7  6  10  5  3    1  2          21  3  1      1  13  82  1  8  246 
China(CH)  1  2  36  14  1  43      513        9  10  31  2  214    3  9  1  2  13  53  1  27  1  6  19  3    3        2  120  34  6  11  10  4    19  58  301    22  1,091 
Colombia(CO)  1    2    3  17    3    37        1  8          1        4  2    10    1  1  2          2      13  3  4        6  35  1  1  121 
Croatia(CT)    12                  26    3    7  1    5    1    1  4  1          2                    1  1  2        8  4    6  59 
Cyprus(CY)            1            37      1  7                                      1            1        2  1      14 
Denmark(DN)    5  4  10    9      1    1  1  889  39  39  1  2      3  11  3  11  8  2  1    94  38        1    1  1  4    4  198  28        117  173    80  890 
Finland(FN)    9  7  7    16              69  1,614  34    2  1    2  22  2  11  23  4      53  24            7  1  5    11  281  31  1  2  1  60  147    41  874 
France(FR)  1  20  28  236  7  116      4        68  38  4,837  8  13  2    12  27  13  164  97  28  1  1  22  209          8  2  6  5  2  87  116  154  2    1  708  970    434  3,610 
Greece(GR)      1  3    4            6      6  339              7  1  2      1  6          1  2          3  5        15  18    9  90 
Hong Kong(HK)      28  1    22      42        10  4  20  3  348    2  1    4  2  30    73      6      2        4  80  8  2  4  7  3  1  4  67  170    14  614 
Hungary(HU)    28    4    3  2        2    2  5  28  3    136    2  2  4  11  5  2      4  42        5    2    2    2  11  14    1  1  26  69    52  334 
Indonesia(ID)      10  1    15                1  2  1  9    98  4      1  16    19    2  4      1        2  24  8    2  7  4  1    26  32    7  199 
India(IN)    5  24  3    15      1        5  2  39    8    1  764  1  2  12  16    17    5  19      1  1    3  6  11  7  6  19  28  3      101  233    43  637 
Ireland-Rep(IR)    1  5  4    8              6  1  18  2  2      4  354  1  3  5  1  1  1  6  10        1  1  3  3  2    2  5  5  1  1    265  172    15  555 
Israel(IS)      2  2    10              3    8    1      1  1  160  2  1          3              3  1  1    3  3    1  1  26  171    12  256 
Italy(IT)    24  17  23  6  24      3        24  19  236  13  10  1  1  10  9  9  1,633  29  16  2    7  98  1        2  5  5  2    38  60  65    1    233  428    164  1,585 
Japan(JP)      1  5    6      4        4  2  31  3  12    2  1  1  3  1  5,698    1      16      1      1  2  1  12  2  11  8  1    9  46  259    42  488 
Luxembourg(LX)    1    16                      8  2              3    8        5  1                1  1  4  2        12  13    14  83 
Malaysia(MA)      17      6              6  2  7    17    2  2    1  1  19    1,711  1  2  7  4    4      1  2  123  1  2  2  8      4  28  43    9  321 
Mexico(MX)  2    4  3  6  116    4  1  2      8  2  24  3  4        4    6  7  1    188  1  18  3  1  1          2  1  35  10  8      1  33  320  1  18  650 
Norway(NO)    3  4  5  2  8            1  102  55  27  1        1  2  2  5  3  4  2  1  688  30      1    1  1  2  1    2  193  21        103  130    26  739 
Netherlands(NT)    16  26  95  5  44    2  1      1  36  27  122  3  9  1    9  60  9  29  39  9  4  2  18  1,512  2      2  2  1  9  3    16  66  47  1  2  3  441  436    228  1,826 
New Zealand(NZ)    2  302  1    41      2        4  3  8    5    1  2  7      19    13    2  14  570    1        6  13  2    5  7  3      71  140    6  680 
Peru(PE)  1    2  1  3  54    6    1            1  1                  2  3    2    39                5    3        7  30    1  123 
Philippines(PH)      10      9                  6    5              11    10  2    1      115          12  1  1  2  2        13  32    2  119 
Poland(PL)    9  1  11    12  4        2    26  16  45  3    5    6  12  3  19  2  13      16  39        227  4  2  2  1  2  13  23  10        57  76    63  497 
Portugal(PO)    1  3  5  5  5    1          8  1  44  1  1  2    2  2    11  2  1    1  4  13          246          72  12  12        51  40    20  320 
Russian Fed(RU)    4  2  7    24  2          8  9  23  10  5    3    2  2    11  3  9      14  18  1      6    526        4  25  15    3    59  83    30  382 
South Africa(SA)      36  2    35              4  4  23  2  3      7  3  1  7  11  4  5    2  11  2    1    2  1  790  3  1    15  15      1  170  113    36  520 
Singapore(SG)      28  1    7      1      1  7  4  16    35    10  22    2  5  25    98    10  8  1    1        3  614  2  1  9  7  9    6  42  116    15  492 
South Korea(SK)    2  3  4    10      1        4  1  27    4      2    4    30    2  1  2  10            1  1  6  631  2  3  8      2  27  107    30  294 
Spain(SP)  2  6  8  32  4  27    5    2  1    44  8  296  8  3      7  10  4  121  29  2    6  15  133        1  60  1  1  1    1,896  60  35        271  287    169  1,659 
Sweden(SW)    9  10  14    24              176  198  67  3  5      4  10  4  11  23  9  1    182  65        1    1  2  3    2  1,558  31      2  218  288  1  99  1,463 
Switzerland(SZ)    43  9  31    20      1    1    38  15  122    5  1    7  10  15  36  16  6  3    8  49        1  2  5  4  6    4  45  794      2  103  261    311  1,180 
Thailand(TH)      5  2    2      1        2  1  9    10    1  7      1  36  1  23    1  6  2    1  1      2  37  1    3  2  194    4  22  40    9  232 
Turkey(TK)    1  1  6    4            1  2  3  16  5  1  2      2  2  10  2    1      9          1  4  1      3  4  2    72    27  33    27  170 
Taiwan(TW)      4      5              2  1  5    11          1    13    2      2                21  5    4  1  2    130  10  82    10  181 
United Kingdom(UK)    29  177  91  2  305  3    1    2  4  158  66  485  17  60  2  2  82  410  20  92  173  21  21  2  89  313  14    1  2  8  10  86  42  9  43  206  126  7  2  5  15,196  3,122    443  6,753 
United States(US)  10  36  392  121  35  2,752  1  8  34  6  1    128  130  719  28  95  1  10 179  316  169  146  827  28  24  73  86  453  28    13  1  5  21  75  104  54  91  351  358  9  5  68  3,073  66,948  5  817  11,886 
Venezuela(VE)  1      1  4  22    1          2    11                5    1    2    2                    7    5        8  49  16  1  122 
Germany(WG)    234  42  105  6  80  5  2  5    1    124  134  454  13  20  3  2  29  38  16  128  111  40  8  5  42  443  1    10  6  3  5  18  11  11  37  194  375  1  5  3  724  1,611  1  5,771  5,106 
Total  66 557 1,360 919 133 4,236  19  60  112 16  12  23 1,199  866  3,634 150 633  40 45 473 1,044 324 1,027 1,874 242  416  160 758 2,588 226  7  51  41  142  90 333 729 171  675  2,127 1,686  54  29 145  8,468  15,034 15 3,969 56,978   35 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of cross-border M&As.  
The table reports the total number of cross-border deals, deals involving public acquirers, deals that are in related 
industries, and finally deals that are in the same region, by target countries (in Panel A) and acquirer countries (in 
Panel B). A deal is in the related industry if the 3-digit SIC codes of a target and its acquirer overlap. A deal is in the 
same  region  if  the  target  and  acquirer‟s  countries  are  located  in    the  same  broadly  defined  continent  (Africa, 
America, Asia, and Europe). 
 




















Argentina  640  457  481  349    66  13  45  62 
Austria  637  415  453  515    557  286  366  489 
Australia  2,238  1,699  1,526  426    1,360  1,153  904  472 
Belgium  1,022  693  699  755    919  504  618  715 
Brazil  1,038  782  743  514    133  62  91  92 
Canada  3,500  2,588  2,311  2,530    4,236  3,428  2,873  3,090 
Czech Republic  442  300  309  336    19  0  17  15 
Chile  246  198  159  142    60  30  43  50 
China  1,091  841  756  527    112  56  76  53 
Colombia  121  97  92  72    16  1  12  14 
Croatia  59  33  44  52    12  10  9  11 
Cyprus  14  11  7  11    23  12  18  14 
Denmark  890  612  604  680    1,199  791  790  940 
Finland  874  632  528  660    866  691  530  650 
France  3,610  2,460  2,365  2,329    3,634  2,754  2,441  2,297 
Greece  90  71  69  64    150  97  102  99 
Hong Kong  614  491  404  277    633  411  416  374 
Hungary  334  219  239  246    40  30  32  35 
Indonesia  199  157  140  95    45  12  26  27 
India  637  468  448  94    473  364  354  69 
Ireland-Rep  555  409  386  347    1,044  798  660  656 
Israel  256  213  177  8    324  281  223  25 
Italy  1,585  1,185  969  1,033    1,027  423  731  725 
Japan  488  383  326  49    1,874  1,585  1,068  341 
Luxembourg  83  57  62  68    242  143  168  176 
Malaysia  321  259  190  195    416  358  254  336 
Mexico  650  508  476  452    160  129  107  134 
Norway  739  544  501  581    758  512  493  586 
Netherlands  1,826  1,346  1,160  1,221    2,588  1,761  1,700  1,784 
New Zealand  680  519  466  363    226  135  155  156 
Peru  123  113  92  98    7  4  6  7 
Philippines  119  94  85  49    51  28  25  20 
Poland  497  358  352  390    41  21  30  31 
Portugal  320  225  243  260    142  73  107  97 
Russian Fed  382  288  301  8    90  42  64  7 
South Africa  520  428  333  0    333  278  218  0 
Singapore  492  389  298  240    729  570  450  524 
South Korea  294  245  202  55    171  147  104  87 
Spain  1,659  1,155  1,149  1,272    675  294  491  360 
Sweden  1,463  1,034  939  1,095    2,127  1,673  1,397  1,547 
Switzerland  1,180  789  770  826    1,686  1,162  1,028  1,040 
Thailand  232  191  154  128    54  34  39  31 
Turkey  170  132  120  121    29  10  20  16 
Taiwan  181  162  122  59    145  107  90  51 
United Kingdom   6,753  4,840  4,459  2,612    8,468  7,087  5,468  3,688 
United States  11,886  9,410  7,558  2,889    15,034  11,508  10,153  3,663 
Venezuela  122  101  87  79    15  5  6  13 
Germany  5,106  3,686  3,122  3,108    3,969  2,414  2,458  2,611 
Total  56,978  42,287  37,476  28,280     56,978  42,287  37,476  28,280   36 
Table 3. Cross-sectional analysis of the intensity of cross-border M&As. 
The dependent variable is the ratio of the number of deals in which the target is from country i and the acquirer is from country j (where i ≠ j) to the total 
number of domestic deals in target country i. (Currency R12)j-i is the difference in the average annual real exchange rate return in U.S. dollars from 1990 to 2007 
between acquirer (j) and target country (i). (Market R12)j-i is the difference in the average annual local real stock market return from 1990 to 2007 between 
acquirer and target country. (Account)j-i is the difference in the index created on the disclosure quality of accounting information. (Legal)j=i is the difference in 
the anti-self dealing index. Same Language is equal to 1 if target and acquirer‟s primary language are the same. Same Religion is equal to 1 if target and 
acquirer‟s primary religion are the same. Geographic proximity is minus the great circle distance calculated using the longitudes and latitudes of the capital cities 
of target and acquirer countries. Average annual real growth rate of the gross domestic product is from 1990 to 2007 and gross national product divided by the 
population is in 1990 U.S. dollars. (Income Tax)j-i is the difference in corporate income tax in 1990. Tax treaty is equal to 1 if there exists a tax treaty between 
target country and acquirer country in 2007. Bilateral trade flow is the value of annual imports by the target firm‟s country from the acquirer firm‟s country as a 
fraction of total annual imports by the target firm‟s country. Trust is a survey-based measure of the average level of trust that citizens from each country have 
toward citizens of the country pair. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. 
  All Target - All Acquirer     Private Target - Private Acquirer     Public Target - Public Acquirer 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)    (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)    (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15) 
(Currency R12)j-i  0.161***      0.145***  0.088***      0.082***  0.306***      0.244** 
  (6.36)        (5.11)    (4.49)        (3.73)    (3.39)        (2.39) 
(Market R12)j-i  -0.055        -0.074    -0.053        -0.055    -0.020        -0.142 
  (-1.00)        (-1.25)    (-1.39)        (-1.22)    (-0.20)        (-1.22) 
 (Account)j-i    0.015***    0.012***    0.005**      0.003*      0.033***    0.029*** 
    (6.32)      (5.33)      (2.46)      (1.65)      (4.34)      (3.59) 
(Legal)j-i    -0.035      -0.148*      0.012      -0.050      -0.248      -0.424** 
    (-0.45)      (-1.78)      (0.18)      (-0.65)      (-1.36)      (-2.14) 
Same Language      0.007    0.006        0.002    0.004        0.030    0.027 
      (0.67)    (0.61)        (0.35)    (0.53)        (1.20)    (0.94) 
Same Religion      -0.012***  -0.003        -0.009***  -0.006**        -0.007    0.004 
      (-3.08)    (-0.96)        (-3.43)    (-2.29)        (-0.85)    (0.48) 
Geographic Proximity      0.002***  0.002***      0.001    0.001        0.004**    0.004** 
      (3.05)    (3.13)        (1.53)    (1.61)        (2.15)    (2.22) 
(Income Tax)j-i        0.001**            0.000***          0.003***   
        (2.49)            (2.69)            (3.14)   
Tax Treaty        -0.034***            -0.017**            0.059   
        (-2.95)            (-2.31)            (1.36)   
Trust        0.001            0.004            0.050   
        (0.21)            (1.10)            (1.60)   
( log GDP per capita)j-i  -0.006**  0.002  0.004*  0.013**  -0.004*    -0.002  0.003**  0.003  0.002  -0.000    -0.005  0.002  0.012**  0.100**  -0.008 
  (-2.21)  (1.28)  (1.67)  (2.17)  (-1.84)    (-1.27)  (2.09)  (1.63)  (0.46)  (-0.11)    (-0.88)  (0.67)  (2.35)  (2.36)  (-1.60) 
(GDP growth)j-i  -0.003**  -0.000  -0.002  -0.000  0.001    -0.002**  -0.001  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001    -0.001  0.001  0.001  0.012*  0.001 
  (-2.07)  (-0.08)  (-1.23)  (-0.31)  (0.49)    (-2.31)  (-1.11)  (-1.55)  (-0.80)  (-0.52)    (-0.29)  (0.29)  (0.44)  (1.73)  (0.49) 
Bilateral Trade   0.788***  0.666***  0.739***  1.083***  0.616***  0.587***  0.511***  0.575***  0.869***  0.496***  0.868***  0.740***  0.771***  1.565***  0.633*** 
  (6.13)  (6.80)  (5.39)  (11.24)  (5.92)    (6.63)  (6.98)  (6.00)  (12.82)  (6.29)    (3.91)  (4.18)  (3.24)  (3.47)  (3.27) 
Constant  0.017***  0.016***  0.033***  0.034  0.027***  0.007***  0.008***  0.014***  -0.004  0.014***  0.017***  0.017***  0.038***  -0.215*  0.032*** 
  (4.86)  (6.11)  (4.87)  (1.36)  (5.13)    (3.12)  (3.84)  (3.13)  (-0.29)  (3.14)    (2.77)  (3.27)  (2.92)  (-1.76)  (2.78) 
Acquirer Country Dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1036  893  1036  174  893    1036  893  1036  174  893    1008  881  1008  174  881 
R-squared  0.55  0.64  0.54  0.89  0.66    0.50  0.52  0.49  0.87  0.54    0.28  0.32  0.26  0.60  0.34   37 
Table 4. Summary statistics on valuation differences between target and acquirer.  
R12, R24, R36 represent real stock returns over the past 12 months, 24 months, 36 months, respectively. MTB is the market-to-book ratio of equity. For market 
MTB, we follow Fama and French (1998) and sum the market value of all firms within a country and divide this sum by the sum of their book value. All stock 
returns (both market and firm-level returns) are in local currency. Definition of developed countries is based on World Bank high-income economies. Definition 
of strong-law countries is based on the anti-self dealing index. 
 
      Developing Target  Developed Target  Weak Law Target  Strong Law Target         
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13) 




















Region  Diversified  Related 
Industry 
Nobs    51488  311  3853  1056  46268  4300  10591  7565  29032  26000  25488  17734  33754 
                             
Market MTBj – Market MTBi    9.93%***  20.58%***  64.74%***  (2.90%)  5.59%***  16.37%***  26.42%***  0.13%  5.52%***  11.86%***  7.97%***  8.50%***  10.68%*** 
    [7.25%]***  [31.19%]***  [64.45%]***  [(5.31%)]**  [5.98%]***  [10.43%]***  [13.75%]***  [1.37%]***  [7.14%]***  [8.39%]***  [6.81%]***  [6.66%]***  [7.46%]*** 
                             
Market R12j –Market R12i    0.30%***  1.44%  0.05%  6.03%***  0.20%**  0.65%**  (0.18%)  0.81%***  0.29%***  0.21%*  0.40%***  0.13%  0.39%*** 
    [0.33%]***  [(0.40%)]  [(3.86%)]**  [8.68%]***  [0.44%]***  [0.77%]***  [(0.23%)]  [0.60%]**  [0.45%]***  [0.29%]***  [0.35%]***  [0.16%]  [0.45%]*** 
                             
Market R24j –Market R24i    0.92%***  1.57%  2.13%***  11.09%***  0.64%***  2.35%***  1.75%***  0.50%  0.49%***  0.88%***  0.96%***  0.58%***  1.10%*** 
    [1.10%]***  [4.88%]  [(1.90%)]  [15.24%]***  [1.08%]***  [2.49%]***  [1.30%]***  [0.56%]*  [0.93%]***  [0.95%]***  [1.31%]***  [0.83%]***  [1.28%]*** 
                             
Market R36j –Market R36i    2.12%***  1.44%  12.79%***  9.54%***  1.22%***  5.01%***  5.74%***  0.20%  0.81%***  2.43%***  1.79%***  1.36%***  2.55%*** 
    [2.45%]***  [3.61%]  [17.06%]***  [18.42%]***  [2.03%]***  [4.67%]***  [4.08%]***  [0.33%]*  [1.63%]***  [2.40%]***  [2.46%]***  [2.14%]***  [2.59%]*** 
                             
Currency R12j –Currency R12i    1.12%***  4.57%***  10.32%***  (5.96%)***  0.46%***  2.55%***  2.80%***  0.25%  0.58%***  0.88%***  1.42%***  0.88%***  1.25%*** 
    [0.26%]***  [1.24%]  [6.18%]***  [(3.68%)]**  [0.11%]***  [0.06%]  [1.27%]***  [0.02%]  [0.15%]***  [0.32%]***  [0.22%]***  [0.14%]**  [0.33%]*** 
                             
Currency R24j – Currency R24i    2.13%***  5.72%**  21.76%***  (13.40%)***  0.79%***  5.89%***  6.04%***  (0.23%)  0.88%***  1.65%***  2.71%***  1.68%***  2.38%*** 
    [0.47%]***  [6.23%]**  [18.28%]***  [(8.69%)]**  [0.08%]  [0.22%]***  [2.26%]***  [(0.52%)]**  [0.24%]***  [0.59%]***  [0.36%]***  [0.25%]***  [0.57%]*** 
                             
Currency R36j – Currency R36i    3.43%***  10.11%***  34.22%***  (23.32%)***  1.38%***  9.45%***  10.39%***  (1.72%)***  1.45%***  2.77%***  4.23%***  2.89%***  3.73%*** 
    [0.91%]***  [16.79%]***  [31.37%]***  [(18.75%)]*  [0.14%]  [0.72%]***  [4.76%]***  [(1.95%)]**  [0.77%]***  [1.34%]***  [0.71%]***  [0.60%]***  [1.14%]*** 
                             
Firm MTBj – Firm MTBi    28.95%***  76.90%  47.03%**  17.27%  27.50%***  (11.37%)  77.40%***  (28.68%)*  32.49%***  44.27%***  7.67%  10.20%  38.94%*** 
    [26.23%]***  [125.7%]**  [32.60%]**  [(20.42%)]  [25.91%]***  [9.39%]  [50.00%]***  [(6.41%)]  [30.16%]*** [30.52%]*** [18.87%]*** [18.84%]*** [30.27%]*** 
                             
Firm R12j –Firm R12i    10.38%***  25.82%*  6.59%**  22.36%**  10.50%***  8.07%**  8.63%***  11.40%***  11.04%***  10.13%***  10.75%***  9.07%***  11.14%*** 
    [6.01%]***  [27.80%]**  [0.25%]  [16.88%]***  [5.98%]***  [7.73%]**  [4.15%]**  [6.91%]***  [6.00%]***  [5.57%]***  [6.70%]***  [3.09%]*  [7.22%]*** 
                             
Firm R24j –Firm R24i    19.34%***  35.75%  11.96%**  41.81%**  19.61%***  11.45%**  17.04%***  18.44%***  21.50%***  20.89%***  17.11%***  16.50%***  21.01%*** 
    [12.15%]***  [49.51%]  [1.70%]  [46.96%]  [12.62%]***  [12.06%]*  [10.12%]***  [12.56%]*** [13.12%]*** [11.86%]*** [12.71%]***  [8.69%]***  [15.01%]*** 
                             
Firm R36j –Firm R36i    23.36%***  115.8%*  20.37%***  63.13%***  23.02%***  19.30%***  21.83%***  17.79%***  26.44%***  23.46%***  23.20%***  18.69%***  26.18%*** 
    [17.02%]***  [116.2%]  [8.98%]*  [52.34%]***  [16.96%]***  [7.78%]*  [15.04%]***  [11.16%]*** [22.33%]*** [18.28%]*** [15.38%]*** [14.33%]*** [20.76%]*** 
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Table 5. Analysis of the intensity of cross-border M&As using panel data on country pairs.  
The dependent variable is the ratio of the number of deals in which the target is from country i and the acquirer is from country j (where i ≠ j) to the total number of 
domestic deals in country i in a particular year. (Currency R12)j-i is the difference in the prior 12-month real exchange rate return between acquirer and target country. 
(Market R12)j-i is the difference in the prior 12-month real stock market return in local currency between the acquirer and the target country. (Market MTB)j-i is the 
difference in the value-weighted market-to-book ratio of the equity between the acquirer and the target country. I_GDP capita is equal to 1 if the acquirer country‟s GDP 
per capita is larger than or equal to that of the target country. Average annual real growth rate of the gross domestic product is from 1990 to 2007 and gross national 
product divided by the population is in 1990 U.S. dollars. Bilateral trade flow is the value of annual imports by the target firm‟s country from the acquirer firm‟s country 
as a fraction of total annual imports by the target firm‟s country. A deal is in the same region if the target and acquirer‟s countries are located in the same broadly defined 
continent (Africa, America, Asia, and Europe). Panel A reports regression results including valuation differences between the target and the acquirer country. Panel B 
reports regression results including valuation for the target and the acquirer separately. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. 
 
Panel A 
   All Targets-All Acquirers     Private Targets-Private Acquirers     Public Targets-Public Acquirers 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)    (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18) 
(Market R12)j-i  0.011***  0.003  0.015***          0.010***  0.001  0.007**          0.006  -0.003  -0.001       
  (3.51)  (1.42)  (3.92)          (3.07)  (0.53)  (2.12)          (0.94)  (-0.52)  (-0.10)       
(Currency R12)j-i  0.030***  -0.000  0.006          0.029***  0.002  0.012          0.028*  -0.001  0.014       
  (3.25)  (-0.06)  (0.64)          (2.85)  (0.48)  (1.23)          (1.93)  (-0.10)  (0.93)       
(Market MTB)j-i        0.003***  -0.000  0.003***          0.004***  -0.001  0.003***          0.003  0.001  0.000 
        (3.79)  (-0.69)  (2.72)          (4.21)  (-0.78)  (3.11)          (1.30)  (0.38)  (0.08) 
(Market R12)j-i ×         
I_GDP capita 
  0.013**              0.016***              0.019*         
  (2.57)              (2.88)              (1.72)         
(Currency R12)j-i × 
I_GDP capita 
  0.053***              0.049***              0.066**         
  (3.25)              (2.75)              (2.08)         
(Market R12)j-i  ×  
Same Region 
    -0.012*              0.005              0.015       
    (-1.80)              (0.70)              (1.33)       
(Currency R12)j-i × 
Same Region 
    0.082***              0.057**              0.050       
    (3.32)              (2.13)              (1.35)       
(Market MTB)j-i ×  
I_ GDP capita 
        0.007***              0.009***              0.005   
        (4.34)              (4.60)              (1.05)   
(Market MTB)j-i ×  
Same Region 
          0.001              0.002              0.009* 
          (0.67)              (0.79)              (1.77) 
( log GDP per capita)j-i  0.031*** 0.030*** 0.030***  0.009  0.010  0.009    0.010  0.010  0.010  -0.001  -0.000  -0.001    0.047*  0.048*  0.046*  0.034  0.035  0.034 
(3.03)  (2.99)  (2.97)  (1.00)  (1.08)  (1.00)    (1.10)  (1.08)  (1.04)  (-0.08)  (-0.03)  (-0.07)    (1.86)  (1.90)  (1.84)  (1.29)  (1.32)  (1.30) 
(GDP growth)j-i  0.000  -0.000  -0.005  0.044  0.043  0.046*    0.007  0.006  0.009  0.033  0.030  0.035    -0.018  -0.023  -0.008  -0.001  -0.003  0.007 
  (0.01)  (-0.01)  (-0.18)  (1.60)  (1.54)  (1.65)    (0.25)  (0.20)  (0.33)  (1.20)  (1.10)  (1.26)    (-0.33)  (-0.42)  (-0.15)  (-0.01) (-0.06)  (0.14) 
Bilateral Trade  0.642*** 0.638*** 0.628*** 0.593*** 0.575*** 0.591***    0.235  0.229  0.221  0.248  0.227  0.246    -0.229  -0.249  -0.238  -0.113  -0.129  -0.120 
  (4.37)  (4.34)  (4.27)  (4.21)  (4.08)  (4.20)    (1.43)  (1.40)  (1.34)  (1.54)  (1.41)  (1.53)    (-0.51)  (-0.56)  (-0.54)  (-0.25) (-0.29) (-0.27) 
Constant  0.082*** 0.082*** 0.083*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022***    0.057*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021***    0.055** 0.056** 0.054** 0.040* 0.040* 0.040* 
  (6.34)  (6.35)  (6.38)  (3.63)  (3.70)  (3.63)    (4.57)  (4.59)  (4.59)  (2.98)  (3.03)  (2.97)    (2.30)  (2.34)  (2.29)  (1.67)  (1.68)  (1.68) 
Year dummies  yes  Yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes    yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes    Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Country pair dummies  yes  Yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes    yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes    Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observations  14200  14200  14200  14050  14050  14050    13699  13699  13699  13558  13558  13558    7726  7726  7726  7669  7669  7669 
R-squared  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.51  0.51  0.51    0.34  0.34  0.34  0.34  0.34  0.34    0.35  0.35  0.35  0.35  0.35  0.35 
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Panel B 
  All Targets-All Acquirers     Private Targets-Private Acquirers     Public Targets-Public Acquirers 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)    (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18) 
(Market R12)j  0.011***  0.003  0.018***          0.005  -0.000  0.004          0.014*  0.007  0.008       
  (3.33)  (0.98)  (4.33)          (1.57)  (-0.16)  (1.02)          (1.88)  (0.93)  (1.03)       
(Market R12)i  -0.011**  -0.004  -0.011**          -0.015***  -0.004  -0.010**          0.002  0.021**  0.009       
  (-2.19)  (-0.77)  (-1.99)          (-3.01)  (-1.02)  (-2.03)          (0.22)  (2.03)  (0.71)       
(Currency R12)j  0.002  -0.001  -0.030***          -0.001  -0.004  -0.026***          -0.013  -0.024*  -0.040**       
  (0.28)  (-0.23)  (-3.05)          (-0.14)  (-0.61)  (-2.62)          (-0.82)  (-1.72)  (-2.24)       
(Currency R12)i  -0.054***  -0.004  -0.036**          -0.057***  -0.013  -0.046**          -0.076***  -0.042  -0.076***       
  (-3.56)  (-0.29)  (-2.37)          (-3.28)  (-1.09)  (-2.53)          (-2.78)  (-1.43)  (-2.67)       
(Market MTB)j        0.002**  0.001  0.003**          0.002  -0.000  0.002          0.002  0.002  -0.002 
        (2.16)  (1.11)  (2.57)          (1.52)  (-0.38)  (1.63)          (0.81)  (0.80)  (-0.59) 
(Market MTB)i         -0.005***  0.003*  -0.003          -0.007***  0.001  -0.005**          -0.005  0.002  -0.002 
        (-3.07)  (1.90)  (-1.26)          (-4.10)  (0.38)  (-2.33)          (-1.03)  (0.55)  (-0.38) 
(Market R12)j × 
 I_ GDP capita 
  0.019***              0.012**              0.022*         
  (3.27)              (2.08)              (1.75)         
(Market R12)i × 
 I_ GDP capita 
  -0.008              -0.014**              -0.028**         
  (-1.36)              (-2.21)              (-2.02)         
(Currency R12)j × 
 I_ GDP capita 
  0.014              0.008              0.043         
  (0.83)              (0.45)              (1.27)         
(Currency R12)i × 
 I_ GDP capita 
  -0.071***              -0.062***              -0.050         
  (-3.86)              (-3.18)              (-1.22)         
(Market R12)j ×  
Same Region 
    -0.016***              0.002              0.014       
    (-2.68)              (0.34)              (1.12)       
(Market R12)i ×  
Same Region 
    0.006              -0.010              -0.016       
    (0.76)              (-1.05)              (-1.03)       
(Currency R12)j ×  
Same Region 
    0.093***              0.070***              0.075**       
    (4.01)              (2.92)              (2.08)       
(Currency R12)i ×  
Same Region 
    -0.076***              -0.054*              -0.034       
    (-2.68)              (-1.68)              (-0.70)       
(Market MTB)j ×  
I_ GDP capita 
        0.004**              0.005**              0.000   
        (2.04)              (2.50)              (0.08)   
(Market MTB)i ×  
I_ GDP capita 
        -0.010***              -0.011***              -0.011**   
        (-5.78)              (-5.11)              (-1.98)   
(Market MTB)j × 
Same Region 
          -0.001              -0.000              0.011* 
          (-0.68)              (-0.15)              (1.74) 
(Market MTB)i ×  
Same Region 
          -0.004              -0.004              -0.008 
          (-1.46)              (-1.37)              (-1.07) 
Bilateral Trade  0.668***  0.642***  0.654***  0.599***  0.581***  0.595***    0.266  0.244  0.252  0.262  0.241  0.257    -0.189  -0.212  -0.198  -0.106  -0.121  -0.110 
  (4.55)  (4.37)  (4.44)  (4.27)  (4.13)  (4.23)    (1.61)  (1.48)  (1.51)  (1.62)  (1.48)  (1.58)    (-0.43)  (-0.48)  (-0.45)  (-0.24)  (-0.27)  (-0.25) 
( log GDP per capita)j-i  0.030***  0.028***  0.029***  0.009  0.016*  0.009    0.009  0.007  0.009  -0.001  0.005  -0.001    0.046*  0.046*  0.045*  0.034  0.046*  0.033 
(2.96)  (2.79)  (2.90)  (0.99)  (1.67)  (1.01)    (1.01)  (0.80)  (0.94)  (-0.13)  (0.49)  (-0.11)    (1.82)  (1.83)  (1.80)  (1.26)  (1.66)  (1.24) 
(GDP growth)j-i  -0.002  -0.013  -0.007  0.044  0.045  0.046    0.003  -0.008  0.005  0.030  0.030  0.033    -0.020  -0.022  -0.013  -0.002  -0.003  0.006 
  (-0.06)  (-0.46)  (-0.23)  (1.57)  (1.62)  (1.64)    (0.09)  (-0.27)  (0.19)  (1.11)  (1.11)  (1.19)    (-0.38)  (-0.41)  (-0.24)  (-0.03)  (-0.06)  (0.12) 
Constant  0.078***  0.079***  0.078***  0.026***  0.021***  0.025***    0.054***  0.055***  0.054***  0.029***  0.025***  0.028***    0.042*  0.043*  0.041*  0.044*  0.042*  0.044* 
  (6.03)  (6.12)  (6.00)  (3.92)  (3.18)  (3.72)    (4.35)  (4.43)  (4.32)  (3.84)  (3.24)  (3.74)    (1.75)  (1.77)  (1.69)  (1.75)  (1.68)  (1.80) 
Year dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes    yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes    Yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Country pair dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes    yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes    Yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observations  14200  14200  14200  14050  14050  14050    13699  13699  13699  13558  13558  13558    7726  7726  7726  7669  7669  7669 
R-squared  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.51  0.51  0.51    0.34  0.34  0.34  0.34  0.34  0.34    0.35  0.35  0.35  0.35  0.35  0.35 
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Table 6. Mispricing vs fundamental: Interpreting the relation between valuation and cross-border mergers.  
The dependent variable is the ratio of the number of deals in which the target is from country i and the acquirer is from country j (where i ≠ j) to the total number of 
domestic deals in country i in a particular year. ∆ Currency FR12 is the difference in the subsequent 12-month real exchange rate return between the acquirer and the 
target country. ∆ Market FR12 is the difference in the future 12-month real stock market return in the local currency between the acquirer and the target country. ∆ (Fitted 
MTB) is the difference in the predicted value-weighted market-to-book equity ratio between the acquirer and the target country, using future 12-, 24-, 36-month real stock 
market return and real exchange rate return. ∆ (Residual MTB) is the difference in the residuals of value-weighted market-to-book equity ratio between acquirer and 
target country, using future 12-, 24-, 36-month real stock market return and real exchange rate return. Fitted MTB = 2.017 - 0.033 FR12 - 0.137 FR24 - 0.299 FR36 - 
0.255 EXFR12 - 0.247 EXFR24 + 0.487 EXFR36 (N=642, R
2=0.094). I_GDP capita is equal to 1 if the acquirer country‟s GDP per capita is larger than or equal to that 
of the target country. Bilateral trade flow is the value of annual imports by the target firm‟s country from the acquirer firm‟s country as a fraction of total annual imports 
by the target firm‟s country. A deal is in the same region if the target and acquirer‟s countries are located in the same broadly defined continent (Africa, America, Asia, 
and Europe). Panel A reports regressions using future12-month stock market and exchange rate returns. Panel B reports regressions using decomposed market-to-book 
ratio. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. 
 
Panel A - Direct tests using future returns. 
  All Targets-All Acquirers    Private Targets-Private Acquirers    Public Targets-Public Acquirers 
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9) 
(Market FR12)j-i  -0.002  0.002  -0.002    -0.001  0.003  0.001    0.007  0.009  0.009 
  (-0.66)  (1.05)  (-0.51)    (-0.25)  (1.47)  (0.27)    (1.06)  (1.40)  (1.15) 
(Currency FR12)j-i  0.016***  0.006*  0.013*    0.015**  0.004  0.018***    0.013  0.009  -0.000 
  (2.70)  (1.71)  (1.92)    (2.14)  (1.00)  (2.65)    (0.85)  (0.78)  (-0.01) 
(Market FR12)j-i × I_ GDP capita    -0.008        -0.006        -0.004   
    (-1.23)        (-1.10)        (-0.30)   
(Currency FR12)j-i × I_GDP capita    0.017        0.019        0.009   
    (1.53)        (1.44)        (0.27)   
(Market FR12)j-i × Same Region      -0.001        -0.005        -0.006 
      (-0.12)        (-0.67)        (-0.45) 
(Currency FR12)j-i × Same Region      0.012        -0.011        0.051 
      (0.81)        (-0.61)        (1.27) 
(log GDP per capita)j-i  0.032***  0.032***  0.032***    0.016  0.016  0.017    0.034  0.034  0.034 
  (2.87)  (2.86)  (2.87)    (1.53)  (1.53)  (1.56)    (1.29)  (1.29)  (1.27) 
(GDP growth)j-i  0.040  0.040  0.039    0.056*  0.055*  0.058**    0.041  0.041  0.040 
  (1.40)  (1.40)  (1.38)    (1.94)  (1.91)  (2.00)    (0.85)  (0.83)  (0.80) 
Bilateral Trade  0.626***  0.627***  0.624***    0.414**  0.414**  0.416**    -0.428  -0.429  -0.454 
  (4.02)  (4.03)  (4.01)    (2.42)  (2.43)  (2.44)    (-0.87)  (-0.87)  (-0.92) 
Constant  0.077***  0.076***  0.077***    0.046***  0.046***  0.046***    0.060**  0.060**  0.061*** 
   (6.52)  (6.45)  (6.52)    (4.05)  (3.98)  (4.03)    (2.57)  (2.56)  (2.60) 
Year dummies  yes  yes  yes    yes  Yes  Yes    yes  Yes  Yes 
Country pair dummies  yes  yes  yes    yes  Yes  Yes    yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  13512  13512  13512    12972  12972  12972    7465  7465  7465 
R-squared  0.49  0.49  0.49    0.33  0.33  0.33    0.34  0.34  0.34   41 
 
Panel B - Decomposing Market-to-book 
   All Targets-All Acquirers     Private Targets-Private Acquirers     Public Targets-Public Acquirers 
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9) 
 (Fitted MTB)j-i   0.001  -0.005**  0.001    0.006**  -0.003  0.004    -0.005  -0.004  -0.011 
  (0.25)  (-2.27)  (0.36)    (2.11)  (-1.27)  (1.27)    (-0.74)  (-0.57)  (-1.36) 
(Residual MTB)j-i  0.005***  -0.000  0.004***    0.005***  -0.001  0.004***    0.007**  0.003  0.003 
  (4.47)  (-0.51)  (3.33)    (4.37)  (-1.01)  (3.58)    (2.15)  (1.16)  (0.79) 
(Fitted MTB)j-i × I_ GDP capita    0.009*        0.016***        -0.004   
    (1.70)        (2.94)        (-0.27)   
(Residual MTB)j-i × I_GDP capita    0.009***        0.010***        0.008   
    (5.10)        (5.01)        (1.27)   
(Fitted MTB)j-i × Same Region      -0.001        0.006        0.017 
      (-0.21)        (0.81)        (1.06) 
(Residual MTB)j-i × Same Region      0.001        0.001        0.011* 
      (0.63)        (0.51)        (1.82) 
( log GDP per capita)j-i  0.006  0.007  0.006    -0.005  -0.005  -0.005    0.027  0.027  0.027 
  (0.60)  (0.69)  (0.59)    (-0.48)  (-0.44)  (-0.46)    (0.88)  (0.88)  (0.87) 
(GDP growth)j-i  0.075***  0.072**  0.076***    0.063**  0.059**  0.065**    -0.025  -0.027  -0.015 
  (2.62)  (2.54)  (2.66)    (2.24)  (2.11)  (2.25)    (-0.50)  (-0.54)  (-0.30) 
Bilateral Trade  0.506***  0.480***  0.505***    0.446**  0.417**  0.444**    -0.385  -0.414  -0.389 
  (3.26)  (3.10)  (3.26)    (2.47)  (2.31)  (2.46)    (-0.86)  (-0.92)  (-0.87) 
Constant  0.022***  0.023***  0.022***    0.013*  0.013*  0.013*    0.053***  0.053***  0.053*** 
   (3.66)  (3.72)  (3.65)    (1.76)  (1.79)  (1.76)    (2.87)  (2.89)  (2.88) 
Year dummies  yes  yes  yes     Yes  yes  yes     yes  Yes  Yes 
Country pair dummies  yes  yes  yes    Yes  yes  yes    yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  11986  11986  11986    11522  11522  11522    6731  6731  6731 
R-squared  0.52  0.52  0.52     0.34  0.34  0.34     0.38  0.38  0.38   42 
Table 7. Deal-level analysis of the intensity of cross-border M&As.  
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the merger is a cross-border deal. The sample includes deals in which both 
target and acquirer are public. Columns (1) and (2) use the difference in the previous year‟s firm-level stock returns 
in U.S. dollars between the acquirer and the target (Firm USR12). Columns (3) and (4) decompose the difference in 
firm-level stock returns in U.S. dollars into three components: market returns in local currency (Market R12) j-i, 
currency returns (Currency R12) j-i, and firm residual stock returns in local currency (Firm USR12-Market R12-
Currency R12) j-i. A deal is in the related industry if the 3-digit SIC codes of a target and its acquirer overlap. 
Marginal effects are reported. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
(Firm USR12)j-i  0.012  0.030*     
  (0.85)  (1.83)     
(Market R12) j-i      0.321**  0.188 
      (2.11)  (1.21) 
(Currency R12) j-i      0.395  0.449 
      (1.28)  (1.39) 
(Firm USR12-Market R12-Currency R12) j-i    0.010  0.028* 
      (0.75)  (1.82) 
Log Firm Size (Target)    -0.011    -0.009 
    (-1.62)    (-1.42) 
Log Firm Size (Acquirer)     0.056***    0.055*** 
    (8.23)    (8.13) 
Related Industry    -0.009    -0.011 
    (-0.33)    (-0.42) 
Year Dummies  yes  Yes  yes  yes 
Country Dummies  yes  Yes  yes  yes 
Observations  2332  1530  2331  1529 
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Table 8. Targets vs acquirers in domestic and cross-border M&As.  
The dependent variable is equal to one if the merging firm is the acquirer and to zero if the firm is the target. The 
sample contains deals in which both target and acquirer are public. Panel A presents domestic mergers while Panel 
B presents cross-border mergers. The first two columns in each panel use the firm-level stock returns in U.S. dollars 
(Firm USR12). The last two columns of each panel decompose firm-level stock returns in U.S. dollars into three 
components: market returns in local currency (Market R12), currency returns (Currency R12), and firm residual 
stock  returns  in  local  currency  (Firm  USR12-Market  R12-Currency  R12).  Marginal  effects  are  reported. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. 
 
   Domestic Deals       Cross-border Deals 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Firm USR12  0.049***  0.055***        0.062***  0.064**     
  (3.96)  (3.95)        (2.72)  (2.38)     
Market R12                0.098  0.099 
                (1.16)  (1.09) 
Currency R12                0.108  -0.192 
                (0.48)  (-0.80) 
Firm USR12-Market R12-Currency R12      0.050***  0.056***        0.059**  0.064** 
      (3.91)  (3.90)        (2.48)  (2.35) 
Log Firm Size  0.122***  0.136***  0.121***  0.136***    0.132***  0.140***  0.132***  0.141*** 
  (22.37)  (20.91)  (22.38)  (20.91)    (14.67)  (12.46)  (14.60)  (12.48) 
Long-term Debt/Asset    0.027    0.027      0.180    0.181 
    (0.36)    (0.36)      (1.08)    (1.09) 
Cash/Asset    0.225***    0.222***      0.318***    0.316*** 
    (3.59)    (3.54)      (2.81)    (2.79) 
Sales growth (2-year)    0.004    0.004      0.019    0.020 
    (0.93)    (0.92)      (1.42)    (1.45) 
Return on Equity    0.126***    0.124***      0.334***    0.335*** 
    (2.99)    (2.95)      (3.92)    (3.99) 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes     Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  3625  3262  3625  3262    1304  1178  1302  1176 
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